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This Article examines the problem of benefit misuse within the
Social Security representative payee system, identifies shortcomings in
the current legal framework for policing the payee's conduct, and
proposes legislative reform. The Social Security "representative payee"
system serves an important function by protecting beneficiaries who
have cognitive impairments and therefore cannot manage their own
financial affairs. For beneficiaries living in an institutional setting, such
as a nursing or group home, however, the appointment of the home or
home administrator as representative payee creates conflicts of interest
that adversely affect the beneficiary. Benefit misuse by representative
payees in this setting tends to go undetected because the Social Security
Administration lacks resources to perform universal audits and the
cognitively compromised beneficiary is often incapable of detecting
financial improprieties. To improve oversight of institutional
representative payees such as nursing and group homes, this Article
proposes that Congress create a "family representative" program wherein
a concerned relative or friend would be authorized to monitor the payee
without assuming the burdens and liabilities of a representative payee
appointment. The family representative would be a person familiar with
the beneficiary's needs and circumstances and would receive a copy of
all reports submitted by the representative payee to the Social Security
Administration. The family representative's access to information
regarding the payee's performance would facilitate greater detection and
reporting of benefit misuse to the Social Security Administration than
under the current system. The Article's Appendix contains legislative
language for a proposed statutory amendment to the Social Security Act
that would implement the family representative program.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the problem of Social Security benefit misuse
by representative payees appointed by the Social Security Administration
(SSA). When a mentally impaired Social Security beneficiary cannot
manage her own financial affairs, SSA has a statutory mandate to appoint
a "representative payee" responsible for accepting payment on the
beneficiary's behalf. Once appointed, the representative payee has a
legal duty to apply all benefit payments toward the beneficiary's living
necessities, medical care, recreation, or personal savings. Congress
established this payment arrangement to prevent vulnerable beneficiaries
from failing to obtain basic necessities or otherwise wasting their benefit
funds. The representative payee system, however, entails direct payment
of funds to third-party payees, so the system creates potential for misuse,
misapplication, or theft of the beneficiary's funds. This problem,
generally known as benefit misuse, is difficult for SSA to detect because
the beneficiary, by virtue of her cognitive impairment, is typically
incapable of ascertaining whether the payee has engaged in financial
improprieties. The representative payee system thus serves a necessary
function by protecting cognitively impaired beneficiaries, but it is also
highly susceptible to abuse by third-party payees.
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This Article will focus on Social Security benefit misuse in cases
where the beneficiary's residential care facility, such as a nursing or
group home, or the administrator of the residential care facility, has been
appointed representative payee. By statute and regulation, SSA has
authority to appoint a beneficiary's residential care facility as
representative payee as a last resort after first searching for a concerned,
competent relative or friend. Appointment of a residential care facility,
however, is disfavored because it creates a conflict of interest for the
representative payee: on one hand, the care facility has a duty as payee
to expend Social Security funds in a manner consistent with the
beneficiary's best interests; on the other hand, the care facility has a
financial incentive to maximize its compensation for services provided to
the beneficiary, and that compensation can be drawn directly from the
beneficiary's monthly Social Security benefit check. Harms resulting
from this conflict of interest undermine the social welfare goals of the
Social Security program by diverting funds from the rightful beneficiary
to representative payees who have breached their statutory duty to
manage the beneficiary's funds properly. Two examples of benefit
misuse, as documented in a study commissioned by SSA, illustrate the
problem:
In one case, a woman took care of three elderly beneficiaries in her
home. She commingled all funds and used the money for food,
clothing, cleaning supplies, medications, taking the beneficiaries out
to dinner once a week, and her own car maintenance. She did not
keep separate accounts, nor did she keep records of expenditures.
The funds were used to keep the group, including her, afloat. The
committee characterized this case as misuse.
In another situation, a group of related payees in one state ran several
homes for the mentally handicapped. They refused to use direct
deposit and pooled all beneficiary funds. There was no rationale for
the amounts charged for room and board, which were very high.
Payees in this family learned from each other how to set up these
homes and they applied for payee status at different SSA offices,
even though they lived close to each other. These payees met
together on a regular basis to discuss fees and other policies for their
group homes. These cases were characterized as misuse by the
2
committee.
2. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., IMPROVING THE SOCIAL
SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE PROGRAM: SERVING BENEFICIARIES AND MINIMIZING
MISUSE 70 (2007), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11992.html [hereinafter NRC
REPORT, SERVING BENEFICIARIES].
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The lack of adequate supervision for representative payees creates
opportunities for fraud and theft committed by payees against the
beneficiaries they are appointed to represent.
It is difficult to quantify the frequency of representative payee
misuse, but the problem is likely to be far more prevalent than official
government reports suggest. SSA's own statistics on payee misuse
indicate a low rate of incidence, but the agency has acknowledged the
difficulty of detecting financial improprieties in this context and the
strong likelihood of underreporting. Empirical studies, anecdotal
accounts, and audits performed by the SSA Inspector General indicate a
sufficiently high prevalence of misuse to warrant further inquiry and
reform. The problem warrants renewed scholarly, legislative, and
agency attention because it adversely affects the most vulnerable
members of society and improperly diverts scarce government resources
at taxpayer expense.
The existing scholarly literature on representative payee misuse
with respect to adult Social Security beneficiaries is scant. This Article
helps to fill that void by advancing two key arguments. First, payee
misuse among residential care facility providers is a significant problem
in need of remedial reform. Second, an additional layer of payee
oversight can and should be achieved at negligible expense by enlisting
greater voluntary participation by the beneficiary's family and friends.
This Article proposes reform designed to reduce the incidence of
representative payee misuse. In particular, the proposed reform
contemplates an oversight program that would authorize a concerned
relative or friend of the beneficiary to monitor the payee and report
evidence of suspected misuse to SSA. This proposal assumes, perhaps
correctly, that the unavailability of family or friends willing to serve as
representative payee does not necessarily demonstrate a lack of family or
friends concerned about the beneficiary. Anecdotal accounts, including a
3. For prior scholarship relating to representative payee appointments for adult
Social Security beneficiaries, see Margaret G. Farrell, Symposium: Doing Unto Others: A
Proposal for Participatory Justice in Social Security 's Representative Payment Program,
53 U. PIrr. L. REV. 883, 891-94 (1992); Joan L. O'Sullivan & Diane E. Hoffmann, The
Guardianship Puzzle: Whatever Happened to Due Process?, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 11, 75 (1995/1996); Joseph A. Rosenberg, Regrettably Unfair: Brooke Astor and
the Other Elderly in New York, 30 PACE L. REV. 1004, 1030 (2010); Samuel Saks,
Comment, Representative Payment Under the Social Security Protection Act of 2004, 51
WAYNE L. REV. 1569, 1573 (2005) (primarily addressing appointment of payees for drug-
and alcohol-dependent beneficiaries). For prior scholarship related to representative
payee appointments for child Social Security beneficiaries (mainly in the foster care
context), see Daniel L. Hatcher, Foster Children Paying for Foster Care, 27 CARoOzO L.
REV. 1797, 1803 (2006); Jim Moye, Get Your Hands Out of Their Pockets: The Case
Against State Seizure of Foster Children's Social Security Benefits, 10 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 67, 68 (2003).
1260 [Vol. 117:4
SOCIAL SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE MISUSE
case litigated in a federal district court by this Article's author, suggest
that beneficiaries often have relatives and friends who may be unwilling
to accept the significant burdens and liabilities associated with serving as
representative payee, but who maintain genuine concern for the
beneficiary's health and welfare. In such cases, SSA could improve the
representative payee system by designating a carefully selected, willing
relative or friend of the beneficiary as a "family representative" with
authority to monitor the representative payee's performance and report
evidence of suspected abuse to the agency.
The proposed family representative program would enable a
concerned relative and friend to assist the beneficiary while minimizing
the burdens of reporting obligations, fiduciary duties, or personal
liability. Far less onerous than a representative payee appointment, a
family representative designation would not require the designee to
assume responsibility for managing the beneficiary's expenses,
maintaining detailed records, or submitting annual reports. SSA would
remain the ultimate party in charge of supervising the representative
payee and pursuing remedies for misuse, so the imposition of personal
liability on the family representative would be unnecessary to protect the
beneficiary. In addition to facilitating better detection of payee misuse, a
family representative system could potentially: (1) provide deterrence
against misuse by payees who know (or think) they are being monitored;
(2) place the beneficiary at greater ease in knowing that a trusted
individual is monitoring the payee; and (3) open new lines of
communication between the nursing home and the beneficiary's family
to enable greater discussion and evaluation of the beneficiary's needs.
These benefits could be achieved with minimal cost to the federal
government because family representatives, like the vast majority of
representative payees, would not be compensated for their service.
The remainder of the Article will proceed as follows. Part I
provides an overview of the Social Security representative payee system
and the current statutory and regulatory protections against payee misuse.
Part II examines the nature and prevalence of benefit misuse in cases
where the beneficiary's residential care facility provider, such as a
nursing or group home, has been appointed representative payee. Part III
proposes a family representative system to facilitate better oversight of
payees in this context, applies agency cost theory as an analytical tool,
and explores the model's doctrinal connection to the trust protector
device in modern trust law. The appendix presents a legislative proposal
for enacting the family representative program.
2013]
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I. THE SOCIAL SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE SYSTEM
A. Overview of the Social Security Representative Payee System
The Social Security Act (the "Act"), a central pillar of the 1935
New Deal economic reforms, created the largest social insurance and
welfare program in the United States.4 The Act's largest programs are
known as Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 5  The OASDI program alone
distributes $725 billion in annual benefit payments to 55 million
beneficiaries, mostly over the age of 65 and/or disabled.6  SSA, the
federal agency responsible for administering the program, distributes
those benefit payments in monthly check disbursements.7 As of January
2013, the average monthly benefit was approximately $1,154.75.8
Generally, SSA issues benefit checks payable directly to the
beneficiary. 9 SSA's direct payment system functions well for competent
beneficiaries, but it is unsuitable for the sizable minority of elderly and
disabled beneficiaries who suffer from cognitive impairment or mental
disability. For those beneficiaries, direct payment of Social Security
benefits would create enormous potential for waste and misuse of funds.
Among the possible perils, mentally impaired beneficiaries could fail to
cash the benefit check or, once cashed, improvidently spend the monthly
benefit amount without first satisfying their most basic living necessities,
such as food, shelter, and clothing. Such outcomes would leave
vulnerable beneficiaries without an effective safety net and wastefully
divert scarce government resources at taxpayer expense.
For those compelling reasons, Congress amended the Act in 1939 to
provide for the appointment of representative payees when necessary to
protect the beneficiary's interest.10 Following appointment by SSA, the
4. See generally Wilbur J. Cohen, Symposium: The New Deal and its Legacy: The
Development of the Social Security Act of 1935: Reflection Some Fifty Years Later, 68
MINN. L. REv. 379, 379-83 (1983).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2006) (OASDI); 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (2006).
6. U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMrN., PUB. No. 13-11700, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT
TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 9 (2012), available at http://l.usa.gov/16Lwlyd
(discussing the OASDI program).
7. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1807(a) (2012).
8. U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., MONTHLY STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT, JANUARY 2013
(2013), available at http:/1 .usa.gov/14wlm9R.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 405(i) (2006).
10. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 205(j), 53 Stat. 1360, 1371
(1939). The Act's current representative payee provision authorizes the Social Security
Commissioner to appoint an individual or organization to receive and handle a
beneficiary's payments upon finding that "the interest of... [the beneficiary] would be
served thereby." 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(1)(A) (2006). A representative payee may be
appointed without regard to "the legal competency or incompetency of the
1262 [Vol. 117:4
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Act directs the agency to certify all Social Security payments to the
representative payee for use on the beneficiary's behalf.1 ' As a condition
of their appointment, representative payees assume several duties,
including obligations to: (1) ascertain the beneficiary's needs and
expend Social Security funds to meet those needs; (2) save and protect
Social Security funds not presently needed for the beneficiary's care;
(3) maintain records of all Social Security funds received and spent on
the beneficiary's behalf; (4) submit accounting reports to SSA at least
annually; and (5) notify SSA of changes that would affect the
beneficiary's eligibility to receive Social Security benefits.' 2  SSA
regulations instruct representative payees to apply benefit funds toward
the provision of food and shelter first, 13 then for medical and dental care
not covered by insurance, 14 and then for clothing and recreation; 15 any
leftover funds must be saved for the beneficiary's future use.16
System-wide, approximately seven million Social Security
beneficiaries receive payments through a representative payee.' 7 Within
the OASDI program, approximately 1.4 percent of retired workers and
11.3 percent of disabled workers receive benefit checks through
representative payee appointments. 18  The majority of representative
[beneficiary] .. " Id. SSA's Program Operations Manual System instructs agency
officers to consider the following when determining whether to appoint a representative
payee: "Does the individual have difficulty answering questions, getting the evidence or
information necessary to pursue the claim, or understanding explanations and reporting
instructions? If so, do you think this difficulty indicates the beneficiary cannot manage
or direct the management of funds?" U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., POMS SECTION: GN
00502.020 DETERMINING CAPABILITY-ADULT BENEFICIARIES (2012), available at
http://l.usa.gov/10alIgR.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(1)(A) (2006).
12. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2035, 416.635 (2012).
13. See U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. No. 05-10076, A GUIDE FOR REPRESENTATIVE
PAYEES (Jan. 2009), available at http://l.usa.gov/12HiPrM [hereinafter REPRESENTATIVE
PAYEES GUIDE]; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040 (2012).
14. See REPRESENTATIVE PAYEES GUIDE, supra note 13, at 7 ("Examples of these
expenses are reconstructive dental care, a motorized wheelchair, rehabilitation expenses
or insurance premiums.").
15. Id. (noting that recreational expenses may include "movies, concerts or magazine
subscriptions").
16. Id. Representative payees for SSI beneficiaries, however, must exercise caution
in saving and spending funds to avoid accumulating more than $2000 in assets, which
would render the beneficiary ineligible for SSI benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(B)
(2006).
17. NRC REPORT, SERVING BENEFICIARIES, supra note 2, at 1.
18. U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. No. 13-11700, ANNUAL STATISTICS SUPPLEMENT TO
THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 5.97 tbl.5.Ll (2011), available at
http://l.usa.gov/YEr9v6 [hereinafter SSA STATISTICS SUPPLEMENT] ("Number of
Beneficiaries with a Representative Payee as a Percentage of All Beneficiaries, By Type
of Beneficiary and Age, December 2010"). In 2010, representative payees were
appointed for approximately 1.56 million adult beneficiaries. Id.
2013] 1263
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payees-nearly 90 percent-are individual payees, while the remaining
10 percent are organizational payees. 19 SSA believes the representative
payee system is significantly underutilized within certain vulnerable
segments of the population. 20 In 2010, for example, the SSA Inspector
General found that approximately "[one] million beneficiaries over age
85 may have been incapable of managing or directing the management of
their benefits" and "had individuals or organizations managing their
Social Security benefits without SSA's knowledge and approval.'
Currently, by contrast, only about 225,000 OASDI beneficiaries over the
age of 85 had representative payee appointments.22 With the aging of the
"baby boomer" generation, SSA predicts a substantial increase in
utilization of the representative payee program over the next two
decades.23
B. Current Protections against Representative Payee Misuse of Funds
Beneficiaries suffering from cognitive impairment or mental
disability rank among the most vulnerable members of society and are
therefore highly susceptible to abuse committed by a representative
payee. To minimize the incidence of fund misuse, Congress enacted
sweeping protections governing the representative payee system. As
19. See, e.g., RENE PARENT ET AL., OFFICE OF RET. & DISABILITY POL'Y, U.S. Soc.
SEC. ADMIN., SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS AND SELF-PERCEIVED PERFORMANCE OF
INDIVIDUAL SOCIAL SECURITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME REPRESENTATIVE
PAYEE (Dec. 2007), available at http://l.usa.gov/WWHGqU. The frequency of
organizational representative payees for adult beneficiaries is likely lower than the
overall frequency of organizational representative payees because SSA appoints
representative payees for all minor beneficiaries, many of whom live in group home
foster care facilities.
20. In 2010, the SSA Inspector General stated the following in an empirical study of
elderly beneficiaries without representative payees:
We initiated this review to examine a concern that SSA may not be aware of
aged beneficiaries who need representative payees. Medical statistics state that
up to 50 percent of individuals over age 85 may suffer from Alzheimer's
disease or dementia. As of December 1, 2008, we had identified about 5
million beneficiaries who were over age 85. However, only 231,817 (4.6
percent) had representative payees. Accordingly, we reviewed a sample of
these beneficiaries to evaluate their capability and need for representative
payment....
U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT REPORT No. A-09-09-
29002, AGED BENEFICIARIES IN NEED OF REPRESENTATIVE PAYEES (Apr. 2010), available
at http://1.usa.gov/15VBYpY [hereinafter AUDIT REPORT].
21. Id. Within the studied sample of beneficiaries in need of a representative payee
but without an official payee appointment, SSA found that 89% of cases involved
unauthorized management by an individual (i.e., the beneficiary's adult child, spouse, or
other relative), while 11% of cases involved management by an organization or agency.
22. See SSA STATISTICS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 18.
23. See AUDIT REPORT, supra note 20.
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described in more detail below, the Act's statutory protections fall
largely into three categories: (1) mandatory qualifications for and
individualized assessment of prospective payees in the appointment
process; (2) reporting requirements and monitoring systems; and (3) civil
and criminal penalties for misuse of Social Security funds. In 2004,
Congress expanded the statutory protections governing the representative
payee program by enacting the Social Security Protection Act of 2004.
Despite the comprehensive scope of the protections now in place,
however, the prevention and detection of representative payee misuse
continues remains a challenge because the beneficiaries for whom SSA
must appoint a representative payee are often incapable of detecting and
reporting the misuse of funds.
1. Mandatory Qualifications and Individualized Assessment
The Act imposes mandatory qualifications for individuals and
organizations seeking to serve as representative payee. In particular,
certain individuals and organizations are categorically prohibited from
serving as a representative payee: (1) persons convicted of specified
crimes; 24 (2) persons or organizations whose status as a representative
payee has been revoked for fund misuse;25 and (3) creditors of the
26beneficiary. Importantly, however, the Act's prohibition on creditors
serving as representative payee contains an exception for a residential
care facility in which the beneficiary resides. 27  The beneficiary's
residential care facility is a creditor to the extent the beneficiary fails to
pay the facility for the provision of care and housing. Under this
exception, a nursing or group home may serve as representative payee if,
"after good faith efforts have been made by the local servicing office of
the Social Security Administration to locate an alternative
representative," no suitable alternative payee has been found.28 This
exception will be discussed in detail below.29
SSA regulations prescribe a priority for the selection of
representative payees: concerned family and friends receive the highest
priority, followed by institutional and organizational payees who have
24. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)(i)(I) (2006).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)(i)(II) (2006).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)(i)(11I) (2006).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)(iii)(I1l) (2006) (exempting "a facility that is licensed or
certified as a care facility under the law of a State or a political subdivision of a State"
from the prohibition on creditor payees).
28. Id. § 405(j)(2)(C)(iii)(IV).
29. See infra Part 11.
2013] 1265
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custody of the beneficiary.3° SSA considers the following factors in
determining whether to appoint a prospective payee:
(a) The relationship of the person to the beneficiary;
(b) The amount of interest that the person shows in the beneficiary;
(c) Any legal authority the person, agency, organization or institution
has to act on behalf of the beneficiary;
(d) Whether the potential payee has custody of the beneficiary; and
(e) Whether the potential payee is in a position to know of and look
after the needs of the beneficiary.
31
The Act requires SSA to scrutinize representative payee
appointments by performing an individualized assessment on behalf of
each beneficiary. SSA must determine whether a given appointment is
suitable on the basis of "an investigation... which shall be conducted in
advance ... and shall, to the extent practicable, include a face-to-face
interview with such person, and adequate evidence that [the
appointment] is in the interest of such individual..., 32 As part of the
appointment process, SSA undertakes several precautionary measures
including verification of the payee's social security number, identity,
income, and (if applicable) custody of the beneficiary.33 Agency officers
are also instructed to look for evidence of the beneficiary's abuse or
neglect, which must be reported to the applicable state health or welfare
agency.34
30. 20 C.F.R. § 404.2021(a) (2012) provides:
As a guide in selecting a representative payee, categories of preferred payees
have been established. These preferences are flexible. Our primary concern is
to select the payee who will best serve the beneficiary's interest. The
preferences are: (a) For beneficiaries 18 years old or older ... our preference
is-(1) A legal guardian, spouse (or other relative) who has custody of the
beneficiary or who demonstrates strong concern for the personal welfare of the
beneficiary; (2) A friend who has custody of the beneficiary or demonstrates
strong concern for the personal welfare of the beneficiary; (3) A public or
nonprofit agency or institution having custody of the beneficiary; (4) A private
institution operated for profit and licensed under State law, which has custody
of the beneficiary; and (5) Persons other than above who are qualified to carry
out the responsibilities of a payee and who are able and willing to serve as a
payee for a beneficiary; e.g., members of community groups or organizations
who volunteer to serve as payee for a beneficiary.
31. Id. § 404.2020.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(A) (2006).
33. U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM (POMS), GN
00502.117 (2012), available at http://l.usa.gov/10eI7ui.
34. U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM (POMS), GN
00502.138 (2012), available at http://1.usa.gov/13y7Mpg ("Evidence of Neglect or
Abuse Discovered During Initial Interview or Payee Investigation").
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2. Reporting Requirements and Monitoring Systems
The Act requires SSA to establish a reporting and monitoring
system whereby all representative payees submit an accounting, at least
annually, on their handling of beneficiary funds.35  To this end, SSA
requires representative payees to maintain and submit itemized records
of all Social Security funds received and purchases made on the
beneficiary's behalf by category (e.g., food, shelter, clothing, and
recreation).36 The Act requires SSA to "establish and implement
statistically valid procedures for reviewing such reports in order to
identify instances in which [representative payees] are not properly using
such payments. 37  SSA uses a computer program to review payee
reports, and the SSA Inspector General performs targeted audits to
ensure compliance.38 The Act authorizes SSA to require payees who fail
to submit required reports to "appear in person at a field office of the
Social Security Administration ... to receive [further] payments., 39 The
Social Security Protection Act of 2004, discussed in more detail below,
requires SSA to perform a "periodic onsite review" of high-volume
individual representative payees (administering benefits on behalf of 15
or more beneficiaries) and organizational payees (administering benefits
on behalf of 50 or more beneficiaries).4 ° In cases where SSA is
presented with evidence calling into question a representative payee's
conduct, agency officers must monitor and personally contact the payee
to perform an investigative inquiry.41
3. Penalties for Misuse
The Act deters payee misuse by imposing criminal and civil
penalties. Intentional misuse of Social Security funds by a representative
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(3)(A) (2006) ("[T]he Commissioner of Social Security
shall establish a system of accountability monitoring whereby [representative payees]
shall report not less often than annually with respect to the use of such payments.").
36. 20 C.F.R. § 404.2065 (2012); see also REPRESENTATIVE PAYEES GUIDE, supra
note 13, at 10-11 (Representative Payee Income and Expenses Worksheet).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(3)(A) (2006).
38. See, e.g., U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT REPORT
No. A-02-11-11161, THE GOLD CREST CARE CENTER-AN ORGANIZATIONAL
REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (2012), available at
http://l.usa.gov/l0R9caB.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(3)(E) (2006).
40. See Social Security Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-203, § 102, 118
Stat. 493 (2004) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1310 (2006)); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4050)
and 1383(a)(2)(G)(i)(III) (2006).
41. U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM (POMS), GN
00504.185, available at http://1.usa.gov/14oXEOQ ("Follow up on Questionable
Representative Payees").
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payee is a felony punishable by five years' imprisonment. 42 Misuse is
also sanctionable by civil monetary penalty and renders the violator
personally liable for the misused funds.43  Upon determining that a
representative payee has misused Social Security benefits, SSA is
required to revoke the representative payee certification "if the interest of
the [beneficiary] would be served thereby," whether or not the payee's
misuse was intentional. 4
4. Social Security Protection Act of 2004
In 2004, President Bush signed the Social Security Protection Act of
2004, legislation enacted to improve the representative payee program in
several respects. 45 The following provisions, including some already
noted above, enhance protections for the representative payee system:
(1) SSA authorization to reissue benefits misused by an organizational
representative payee "[i]n cases where the negligent failure of the
Commissioner of Social Security to investigate or monitor a
representative payee results in misuse of benefits by the representative
payee"; 46 (2) statutory mandate requiring SSA to perform a periodic
onsite review of high-volume representative payees; 47 (3) disqualification
of individuals convicted of offenses resulting in imprisonment for more
than one year;48 (4) fee forfeiture in cases of benefit misuse by
representative payees authorized to charge the beneficiary a servicing
fee;49 (5) personal liability imposed on representative payees for fund
misuse;50 (6) SSA authorization to redirect delivery of benefit payments
when a representative payee fails to provide a required accounting; 51
(7) statutory mandate (and $8.5 million in legislative appropriations)
requiring SSA to conduct surveys of the use of payments to
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(5) (2006) ("Whoever- ... having made application to
receive payment under this subchapter for the use and benefit of another and having
received such a payment, knowingly and willfully converts such a payment, or any part
thereof, to a use other than for the use and benefit of such other person;... shall be guilty
of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be fined under Title 18 or imprisoned for
not more than five years, or both.").
43. See id. § 1320a-8(3); id. § 405(j)(7) (2006).
44. Id. § 405(j)(1)(A) (2006).
45. See generally Erik Hansen, A Legislative History of the Social Security
Protection Act of 2004, 68 Soc. SEC. BULL. 41 (2008).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 4050)(5) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
47. See id. § 1383(a)(2)(G)(i)(11I).
48. See id. § 405(j)(2)(B)(i)(IV).
49. See id. § 405(j)(4)(A)(i).
50. See id. § 405(j)(7).
51. See id. § 1007(h)(3) (2006).
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representative payees;5 2 and (8) civil monetary penalties for wrongful
53conversion by representative payees.
5. Inherent Challenges Facing the Representative Payee Program
The current framework of statutes and regulations reflects a
laudable effort to protect a vulnerable population of mentally impaired
Social Security beneficiaries. Despite such sweeping protections,
however, mentally disabled beneficiaries remain at risk of representative
payee misuse because the system lacks a reliable mechanism for
detecting financial improprieties. SSA itself has acknowledged the
difficulty of detecting misconduct arising from the beneficiary's inability
to monitor and assess the payee's performance.5 4 A beneficiary who is
sufficiently incapable of managing her own finances to necessitate the
appointment of a representative payee is likely to be equally incapable of
determining whether the representative payee has misused her benefit
payments. The problem is particularly acute in nursing and group home
settings, where the beneficiary receives ongoing care and may not be
aware of the availability of Social Security benefits that could, but for
representative payee misuse, be used to supplement that care.
In 2007, acting under its statutory mandate to conduct survey
research on the representative payee system, SSA commissioned a
detailed analysis of moderate-volume individual and organizational
representative payees by the National Academy of Sciences." The
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 13 10(c) (2006).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-8(a)(3) (2006).
54. See Ensuring the Integrity of'Social Security Programs: Protecting Seniors from
Representative Payee Fraud: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong.
2-11 (2003) (statement of James G. Huse, Jr., SSA Inspector General). The SSA
Inspector General offered the following testimony:
Our ability to deter and punish abusive representative payees hinges on
referrals from SSA, documentation from SSA, and adequate legislation. A
June 2002 review showed that SSA failed to refer 78 percent of representative
payee abuse cases to our office for review. This represented over $5.9 million
in misused benefits.
Our audit work indicates that your premise is correct, that many of these reports
are not submitted and we also know they are not followed up on. These
become workloads that are deferred for many reasons for example, resources
and available time-and the net effect is that we do not know what we do not
know, and that is not a good thing.
Id. at3, 11.
55. See Social Security Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-203, § 107, 118
Stat. 493, 506 (2004) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1310 (2006)); see also NRC
REPORT, SERVING BENEFICIARIES, supra note 2, at 119 (surveying individual
representative payees serving less than 15 beneficiaries and non-fee-for-service
organizational representative payees serving less than 50 beneficiaries).
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resulting report, "Improving the Social Security Representative Payee
Program: Serving Beneficiaries and Minimizing Misuse," identified
several weaknesses in the post-2004 representative payee system,
including the following observations:
Relying on beneficiaries or third parties to report misuse to the Social
Security Administration is not a reliable or efficient primary strategy
for detecting misuse. 56
The methodology used by the Social Security Administration
Inspector General does not detect misuse. 
57
It is difficult to find appropriate payees for at-risk beneficiaries.
58
It is too easy for representative payees to learn that if they just fill out
the accounting form with some plausible, but possibly inaccurate
information, they will have complied with the program's reporting
requirement and that there will be no follow-up or other
consequences. Essentially, the current monitoring process is an
'empty threat' that can easily be subverted and is an expensive
administrative tool that does not yield the sort of data that are
necessary to uncover misuse. 
59
The Social Security Administration does not have a method for
systematically evaluating and validating the material it receives on
the annual accounting forms. The data on the accounting form are
not retrievable for statistical analysis and therefore, empirically based
policies and regulations cannot be formulated. In addition, the Social
Security Administration's legislative obligation to statistically
tabulate the annual accounting form remains unfulfilled.6 °
Although SSA had officially reported the amount of misused funds as
0.01 percent program-wide, National Academy researchers concluded
that the actual incidence of misuse is likely to be "a small percentage of
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 10.
60. NRC REPORT, SERVING BENEFICIARIES, supra note 2, at 10.
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misusers in the [overall] population (about 0.2 percent), but...
significantly higher than the SSA estimate.,
61
Following the report's publication, SSA engaged in efforts to
implement the National Academy's recommendations, 62 but inherent
difficulties associated with identifying at-risk beneficiaries and detecting
instances of benefit misuse persist, at least in part, because SSA lacks
sufficient resources to perform comprehensive on-site auditing for a
greater number of representative payees. 63  Comprehensive on-site
auditing, however, is costly to administer and subject to a rule of
diminishing returns, so policy reform that would simply expand the
Inspector General's audit program would likely present an inefficient
solution.
II. NURSING AND GROUP HOME REPRESENTATIVE PAYEES
This Part examines the problem of benefit misuse in cases where the
beneficiary's residential care facility, such as a nursing or group home,
has been appointed as representative payee. Approximately 10 percent
of beneficiaries with representative payee appointments live in a nursing
or group home,64 and a portion of those beneficiaries are individuals for
61. Id. at 4. The study reported the following:
The [study] committee developed a new approach of identifying potential
misusers and interviewing them with a two-person team that included an
auditor and a social scientist with the goal of improving the ability to detect
misuse in samples. In an in-depth study of 76 cases selected using this new
methodology, the committee found 16 (21 percent) misusers and 17 (22
percent) cases of possible misuse but for which there was insufficient
information to confirm misuse. Applying the committee's methodology to the
types of payees that the committee studied, more than 40,000 representative
payees have many of the characteristics associated with misuse and warrant
investigation. Among those estimated 40,000 payees, an investigation would
probably find about 7,000 misusers and another 7,000 uncertain or potential
misusers. The total number is still a small percentage of misusers in the
population (about 0.2 percent), but it is significantly higher than the SSA
estimate.
Id.
62. See, e.g., Memorandum from Patrick P. O'Carroll, Inspector General, Soc. Sec.
Admin., to Laurie Watkins, Phila. Reg'I Adm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., Organizational
Representative Payee Serving as an Individual Representative Payee in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (Audit Report No. A-03-09-29094), at 2 (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://l.usa.gov/1102p0o [hereinafter Representative Payee Memorandum].
63. See NRC REPORT, SERVING BENEFICIARIES, supra note 2, at 102 ("Although
failure to submit the [annual accounting] form can be an indicator of improper use or
misuse, SSA told the committee that resources are inadequate for fully pursuing and
investigating payees who fail to submit annual accounting forms ... ").
64. Id. at 35. The beneficiaries described in this part reside in a group home,
residence for senior citizen, nursing home, long-term care hospital or related institution,
or facility for persons with mental retardation or physical disability. Id.
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whom SSA has appointed the home itself or home administrator as the
beneficiary's representative payee.65 For purposes of this discussion, the
terms residential care facility, nursing home, and group home refer to "a
facility that is licensed or certified as a care facility under the law of a
State or a political subdivision of a State."66
A. Structural Conflicts of Interest in Creditor/Payee Appointments
As a general rule, the Act prohibits creditors of the beneficiary-
including, in particular, persons and organizations that provide the
beneficiary "with goods or services for consideration"-from serving as
the debtor/beneficiary's representative payee.67 This prohibition exists to
avoid creating financial conflicts of interest between the payee and
beneficiary.68 When a beneficiary is indebted to the representative
payee, the payee's personal interest in obtaining repayment inevitably
compromises her objectivity in determining how to allocate the
beneficiary's Social Security funds. Suppose, for example, a creditor of
the beneficiary were to serve as representative payee. Discharging the
payee's fiduciary duties would require the application of Social Security
payments toward the beneficiary's basic living necessities before other
types of expenses, including indebtedness to creditors. The payee,
however, would have a financial incentive to apply benefit payments
toward the repayment of the debt before satisfying the beneficiary's basic
needs. Granting a creditor/payee direct access to the beneficiary's Social
Security payments enables the creditor/payee to act upon this impulse.
Thus, the debtor-creditor relationship has a tendency to distort the
beneficiary-payee relationship in ways that adversely affect the
beneficiary's welfare and increases the likelihood of fund misuse.
Despite the financial conflicts of interest that arise when a creditor
of the beneficiary serves as representative payee, the Act contains an
exception allowing for the representative payee appointment of a nursing
or group home, defined by statute as "a facility that is licensed or
certified as a care facility under the law of a State or political subdivision
of a State."6 9 Such appointments are disfavored and only granted after
"good faith efforts have been made by the local servicing office of the
65. A sizable population of Social Security beneficiaries live in nursing or group
homes and have a family member serve as representative payee. Family payees are not
discussed in this Part.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)(iii)(III) (2006).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)(i)(III) (2006).
68. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)(iv)(II) (2006) (noting that the Commissioner must
be satisfied that "the financial relationship of such individual to the beneficiary poses no
substantial conflict of interest").
69. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)(iii)(II1) (2006).
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Social Security Administration to locate an alternative representative
payee to whom such certification of payment would serve the best
interests of [the beneficiary]."7 ° Thus, in practice, when a beneficiary
living in a nursing or group home has no family member or friend
willing to serve as representative payee, SSA is authorized to appoint the
care facility itself (or care facility administrator) as the beneficiary's
representative payee. Appointment of a nursing or group home rather
than a family member as representative payee is an undesirable outcomes
borne out of necessity, given that someone must be appointed as an
intermediary between SSA and the cognitively impaired beneficiary.
The Act's authorization of such appointments, however, creates
conflicts of interest that can lead to fraud and abuse of the beneficiary's
funds. Because the facility/payee provides the beneficiary with shelter
and food for consideration, it has a financial incentive to inflate the cost
of providing those essential services and to compensate itself for the
overcharges through the beneficiary's Social Security payment.
Unscrupulous facilities may also be tempted to charge the beneficiary for
goods and services without actually providing them. This species of
misuse is incredibly difficult to detect because overcharges may seem
facially legitimate when reported on the annual accounting form
submitted to SSA and the beneficiary is unlikely to detect the misuse.
For these reasons, the National Academy of Sciences recommended that
SSA "reevaluate its policies that permit creditors and administrators of
facilities to serve as payees" in its 2007 report.7'
B. Examples of Misuse in the Nursing and Group Home Setting
Audits performed by the SSA Inspector General following the
National Academy's 2007 report show that the appointment of nursing
and group homes as representative payees continues to place
beneficiaries at risk of misuse. In the absence of evidence of intentional
misuse, however, SSA appears to tolerate noncompliance so long as the
payee agrees to undertake corrective action. The agency's willingness to
leave seriously noncompliant representative payees in place highlights
the need for better oversight of payees and, to a lesser extent, the
difficulty of locating alternative representative payees for nursing and
group home residents.
Consider, for example, the results of a 2009 audit titled, "Individual
Representative Payees Serving Multiple Beneficiaries," in which the
SSA Inspector General uncovered several instances of a representative
70. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)(iii)(IV) (2006).
71. NRC REPORT, SERVING BENEFICIARIES, supra note 2, at 7.
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payee's failure to "manage benefits in the beneficiaries' best interests. 72
In that case, the subject of the audit served as an individual payee for
nine beneficiaries and as an organizational payee for 18 beneficiaries
living at two assisted living group homes under the payee's care in a
low-income neighborhood of Philadelphia.73 Of the nine beneficiaries
represented by the payee in his individual capacity, eight lived in the
payee-managed group homes and one lived at the payee's own
residence.74 During the audit period, the payee received $312,960 in
benefit payments on behalf of 27 beneficiaries.75 The Inspector General
found several instances in which the payee's handling of benefit funds
violated statutory and regulatory requirements.
First, the audit revealed that the payee lacked supporting
documentation for a substantial portion of expenditures:
[T]he representative payee was unable to provide supporting
documentation to account for about $105,000 (34 percent) in
expenditures for 10 of the 27 beneficiaries in his care []. The
representative payee did not have evidence of an agreement or
contract that defined what the representative payee's duties were, the
services rendered to the beneficiaries, or the beneficiaries'
obligations.
76
Despite substantial noncompliance in record keeping, the Inspector
General concluded there was no direct evidence of fund misuse or
neglect of the beneficiary's basic living necessities:
Although we were not able to confirm how these funds were
expended without supporting documentation, nothing came to our
attention that led us to believe that food, clothing, and shelter were
not being provided to the beneficiaries. Furthermore, our interviews
with nine beneficiaries did not disclose any concerns that led us to
believe the beneficiaries' needs were not being met.77
Second, the audit revealed that the representative payee had
"commingled 18 beneficiaries' payments with his operating account":
According to the representative payee, he received the beneficiaries'
payments by paper check, cashed the checks at a local check-cashing
facility, and deposited the funds in the organization's operating
account. The representative payee did not maintain check registers or
72. Representative Payee Memorandum, supra note 62, at 3.
73. See id. at 2.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. at 4.
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copies of the canceled checks to account for about $170,000 (54
percent) of the $313,000 in payments received for the 18
beneficiaries.
78
Third, the auditors uncovered a situation that, absent detection, would
have resulted in the payee's misuse of funds:
While conducting our previous audit, we learned that one of the
beneficiaries in the payee's care had been missing since early
September 2008. During two visits in September 2008, the
representative payee informed us that he did not know the
beneficiary's whereabouts and failed to report this event to SSA. We
informed SSA on September 24, 2008 that the beneficiary had been
missing. SSA paid the October 2008 benefits to the representative
payee but suspended the payments from November 2008 to February
2009 when the beneficiary was found living in another State. In
February 2009, the Agency assigned a new representative payee who
received the suspended benefit payments for the 4-month period.
Because we immediately reported this event to SSA, it avoided the
representative payee receiving an overpayment for this beneficiary
from November 2008 to February 2009.
79
After receiving the audit results, the representative payee submitted a
written "Plan of Correction" containing the following representations:
Corrective action has been implemented to ensure Social Security
benefits are properly used and accounted for. Each beneficiary who
reside[s] at Quality Assisted Care and Chestnut Manor now has an
established checking account that shows [the] beneficiary's name
first as owner and organization as representative payee. W[h]ere
[sic] their benefits will be directly deposited in their Individual
account.
The monthly rental contract charges for each beneficiary include
personal care services, food, clothing, transportation, and shelter will
be transfer [sic] from the beneficiary checking account to the
organizational business account. A minimum of eighty five dollars
of the beneficiary['s] funds will be available for the beneficiary['s]
personal and spending needs. Each beneficiary will sign as they
received [sic] their $85.00. Complete and accurate record[s] will be
kept for each beneficiary. Social Security Administration will be
notified promptly of any changes in beneficiary circumstances as
required by S6 cial Security Administration. 
80
78. Representative Payee Memorandum, supra note 62, at 5.
79. Id. at 6.
80. Id. at app. E.
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SSA accepted the payee's written assurance of compliance and-
despite discovering numerous violations-allowed the payee to continue
serving the beneficiaries under his care.81 SSA agreed with all seven of
the auditor's precautionary recommendations, including to:
1. Refrain from placing additional beneficiaries with this
representative payee until the representative payee has implemented
corrective actions to ensure Social Security benefits are properly used
and accounted for. If these corrective actions are not implemented
within 6 months, consider placing each of the representative payee's
beneficiaries with a new representative payee.
7. Conduct follow-up reviews of the representative payee to ensure
the payee is complying with SSA's requirements.
82
Presumably, SSA found the payee's promise of future compliance to be
credible. SSA also likely determined that identifying and appointing
alternative representative payees would be more harmful or disruptive to
the beneficiaries than leaving the existing payee in place. SSA's promise
of continued oversight for this particular payee may have helped deter
further violations.
In this case, the payee's inappropriate handling of beneficiary funds
was most likely the result of carelessness rather than fraud. But even
careless behavior can materially and adversely impact the beneficiary's
health and welfare. Failure to maintain written documentation regarding
the scope and cost of care provided by the facility enables the
administrator/payee to overcompensate himself for the provision of
shelter, food, and medical care. Failure to account for the whereabouts
of beneficiaries residing at the administrator/payee's own facility
suggests a blatant disregard for or inability to ascertain the beneficiary's
needs. The administrator/payee's undocumented commingling of benefit
funds creates the potential for unauthorized transfers of Social Security
benefits among beneficiaries residing at the facility.
In other cases, more egregious examples of payee misconduct have
been documented in which payees intentionally misused funds and
engaged in calculated attempts to conceal their fraudulent behavior from
SSA. 83 Anecdotal accounts of payee fraud and abuse, including a pro
81. See id. at 9.
82. Id. at 9.
83. See NRC REPORT, SERVING BENEFICIARIES, supra note 2, at 70 (2007). The
National Academy study recounts two examples of individuals operating group homes
while serving as the resident's representative payee:
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bono case litigated by the author of this Article in a federal district court,
suggest that intentional misuse may be far more prevalent than SSA's
official statistics report.
III. A "FAMILY REPRESENTATIVE" PROPOSAL
This Part will propose novel reform designed to enhance oversight
in cases where a mentally disabled beneficiary's residential care facility,
such as a nursing or group home, has been appointed representative
payee. The proposal calls for the creation of a "family representative"
program, in which a concerned relative or friend would be appointed to
monitor the representative payee in a non-fiduciary capacity. This model
is loosely based on the "trust protector," a relatively recent feature of
trust law designed to facilitate closer oversight of the trustee's discharge
of fiduciary duties.
A. The Potential for (and Limitations oj) Family Oversight
The appointment of a nursing or group home administrator as
representative payee is an option of last resort employed when the
beneficiary lacks family or friends willing to serve. Importantly,
however, the unavailability of a relative or friend willing to serve as
representative payee does not necessarily indicate the absence of
individuals who may be concerned for the beneficiary's care and welfare.
The beneficiary may have concerned family and friends who already
look after the beneficiary but for one reason or another are unwilling to
assume the burdens and liabilities associated with serving as
representative payee. Caring for an individual with cognitive
impairments can be tremendously difficult and at times seemingly
unrewarding, so even a relative or friend who initially agrees to assume
In one case, a woman took care of three elderly beneficiaries in her home. She
commingled all funds and used the money for food, clothing, cleaning supplies,
medications, taking the beneficiaries out to dinner once a week, and her own
car maintenance. She did not keep separate accounts, nor did she keep records
of expenditures. The funds were used to keep the group, including her, afloat.
The committee characterized this case as misuse.
In another situation, a group of related payees in one state ran several homes
for the mentally handicapped. They refused to use direct deposit and pooled all
beneficiary funds. There was no rationale for the amounts charged for room
and board, which were very high. Payees in this family learned from each
other how to set up these homes and they applied for payee status at different
SSA offices, even though they lived close to each other. These payees met
together on a regular basis to discuss fees and other policies for their group
homes. These cases were characterized as misuse by the committee.
Id. These examples show the potential for problems when creditors of beneficiaries also
serve as representative payees. Id.
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the burdens and liabilities of a payee appointment may resign out of
frustration arising from the many challenges associated with caring for a
mentally disabled individual.
Conceivably, concerned relatives and friends would find it more
palatable to assist the beneficiary if their assistance did not require
assuming the official responsibilities of a representative payee, including
expense management, record keeping, and the filing of annual
accounting reports. If given the opportunity to offer assistance through a
less onerous format, free from personal liability, concerned relatives and
friends with personal knowledge of the beneficiary's needs and living
situation might be more willing to help supervise the representative
payee. Assistance of this sort would be helpful even if it consisted
merely of receiving and reviewing the representative payee's annual
accounting submitted to SSA. Upon discovery of potential misuse, the
relative or friend could then report evidence of suspicious activity to
SSA.
To this end, this Article proposes that SSA create and implement a
program through which a concerned relative or friend of the beneficiary
could be designated as a "family representative" with permissive
authority to oversee the representative payee's conduct. With immunity
from personal liability, no obligation to file paperwork, and knowledge
that participation is voluntary and gratuitous, a family representative
appointment would be far less burdensome than a representative payee
appointment. To enable effective oversight, SSA would have to grant
the family representative access to the beneficiary's Social Security
payment information and all reports filed by the representative payee.
The family representative could use this data, along with personal
knowledge of the beneficiary's living situation, to determine whether the
representative payee has committed misuse and, upon reasonable
suspicion, notify SSA of potential misconduct. An arrangement of this
sort holds potential to increase detection of misuse because concerned
family and friends are likely to have better access to information about
the beneficiary's care and living situation than SSA. For example, if a
representative payee has reported spending $100 per month on clothing
for the beneficiary for the prior 12 months, but the family representative
has observed the beneficiary wearing the same clothes for the entire past
year, then the family representative may have reason to question the
representative payee's conduct. By contrast, without first-hand
observation of the beneficiary, SSA would have no basis to uncover this
type of fraud or misuse.
A family representative program enhancing payee oversight in this
manner is consistent with recommendations by the National Academy.
In particular, the National Academy found that, while many aspects of
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SSA's payee oversight system were ineffective, "[t]he use of a
specialized team of auditors was effective in uncovering misuse of funds
by representative payees. ' '84 But in practice, a large scale program of on-
site, specialized audits performed by the agency would be cost
prohibitive and manifestly impractical. A family representative program,
however, could replicate many of the same benefits. By creating a vast
network of concerned relatives and friends, SSA could establish, in
effect, an army of private auditors perpetually on the lookout for
representative payee misuse without incurring the expense of expert
auditors hired by the agency. A family representative system would also
seem to answer many of the National Academy's criticisms of the
current representative payee system by: (1) reducing reliance on
mentally impaired beneficiaries and random third parties to report payee
misuse; (2) facilitating individualized oversight of the representative
payee for each beneficiary with a family representative; (3) increasing
the likelihood of discovering inaccurate but plausible entries on the
annual accounting form; and (4) providing a low-cost system for
evaluating information reported on the annual accounting form.
85
Creation of a family representative system may also give rise to
positive, spill-over effects that extend beyond the prevention of Social
Security benefit misuse. By facilitating and encouraging a higher level
of participation in the beneficiary's care and welfare among concerned
family members and friends, the system may open productive lines of
communication between the family representative and care facility
administrator. Once productive lines of communication are established,
family representatives may be more inclined to provide the facility
administrator with constructive feedback and to express concerns about
the beneficiary's overall level of care. This type of dialogue would inure
to the benefit of cognitively impaired beneficiaries, who are often
incapable of assessing problems and communicating with the facility
about quality of care issues unrelated to their Social Security benefits.
Although a family representative system may hold potential to
improve the representative payee program, there are some possible
drawbacks. First, and most importantly, some relatives and friends who
express concern for the beneficiary may, in fact, be predatory individuals
in search of a victim, so granting them access to information about the
beneficiary's Social Security benefits could create new avenues for fraud
and misuse that do not currently exist. To prevent the appointment of
untrustworthy family representatives, SSA should apply the same
standard of scrutiny employed in the selection of individual
84. Id. at 5.
85. See supra Part I.B.5.
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representative payees, including the statutory prohibition on creditors,
individuals previously found to have misused Social Security funds, and
individuals convicted of certain crimes from serving as a family
representative. 86 SSA should also adopt selection criteria similar to those
used in the appointment of representative payees.87
Second, some family representatives might express concern for the
beneficiary at the outset and intend to oversee the representative payee's
conduct, but once appointed, fail to do so. Other family representatives
might attempt to oversee the representative payee's conduct but lack
sufficient command of math, accounting, or financial management to do
so competently. Because the family representative proposal
contemplates immunity from suit, incompetent family representatives
would not be liable to SSA or the beneficiary for failure to provide
adequate oversight. In such cases, the goals of the family representative
program will be significantly shortchanged. However, even in cases
where the family representative fails to oversee the payee properly,
benefits nevertheless obtain from the very fact of appointing a family
representative. A care facility payee's knowledge that SSA has
appointed a family representative, even an incompetent one, may create
the appearance of oversight, thereby deterring misconduct that otherwise
might have occurred.
B. Agency Costs and the Trust Protector Model
The family representative program proposed in this Part bears a
doctrinal connection to a relatively recent development in private trust
law-the settlor's appointment of a "trust protector" empowered to
oversee the trustee's performance.88 In the trust law context, the trust
protector model tends to reduce agency costs inherent in the settlor-
trustee-beneficiary relationship, therefore, providing a useful analogy to
the representative payee context where SSA's lack of access to
information about the Social Security beneficiary naturally limits its
ability to monitor and evaluate the performance of the representative
payee.
86. See supra Part I.B.1.
87. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.2020 (2012); supra Part IB 1.
88. The modem conception of a "trust protector" was imported from practices in
foreign jurisdictions recognizing self-settled asset protection trusts. See, e.g., Stewart E.
Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 2761,
2764 (2005); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 cmt. (amended 2005) ("'Trust protector,' a term
largely associated with offshore trust practice, is more recent and unusually connotes the
grant of greater powers, sometimes including the power to amend or terminate the
trust.").
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A rich literature of law and economics scholarship has explored the
agency costs inherent in relationships where an agent is retained to
perform a service on behalf of a principal. 89  Because agents will
instinctively act to further their own interests whenever possible, the
principal must incur agency costs to ensure that, when faced with a
choice of benefitting himself or the principal, the agent will undertake
actions most consistent with the principal's welfare.90 The principal's
cost of monitoring the agent for breach of fiduciary duty is a classic
example of an agency cost.91
An important subset of agency cost literature applies this theory to
the trust law context, in which a trustee manages donated assets on
behalf of beneficiaries subject to the settlor's ex ante instructions.92
Viewed from the prospective of agency cost theory, the trustee can be
characterized as an agent of both the settlor (whose donative purposes
are served by faithful implementation of the trust) and the beneficiaries
(the beneficial objects of the settlor's conveyance).93 The trustee's
conduct is governed by fiduciary duties, but neither the settlor nor the
beneficiaries may be suitable monitors of the trustee's performance. The
settlor, assuming she is still alive, is generally precluded by law from
enforcing the trustee's fiduciary duties with respect to a private
irrevocable trust because, once the conveyance becomes irrevocable, the
settlor is said to lack a concrete stake in litigation concerning the trust;
beneficiaries are the parties directly harmed by the trustee's breach, so
the beneficiary's claims to litigation standing prevails over those of the
settlor.94 The beneficiaries, however, often lack sufficient information
89. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Finn: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 621, 648 (2004) (presenting the normative claim "that the law should minimize the
agency costs inherent in locating managerial authority with the trustee and the residual
claim with the beneficiaries, but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex
ante instructions of the settlor"). But see Lee-ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic
Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2579, 2640 (2011) ("An agency
cost theory of trusts produces not only a positively inaccurate account of modem trusts
but a normatively incoherent philosophy to guide the evolution of trust law. Because the
underlying assumptions of agency cost theory cannot be verified and because agency cost
theory causes distortions of trust law theory and practice, utilizing agency cost analysis
would provide inaccurate if not incoherent answers to open trust law questions.").
93. Cf Sitkoff, supra note 92, at 624.
94. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(1) (2012) ("A suit against a
trustee of a private trust to enjoin or redress a breach of trust or otherwise to enforce the
trust may be maintained only by a beneficiary or by a co-trustee, successor trustee, or
other person acting on behalf of one or more beneficiaries.").
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and expertise to monitor the trustees properly. 9 Agency costs increase
as the trustee's conduct becomes more difficult to police.
To alleviate some of the difficulties associated with fiduciary
enforcement-and, by extension, to reduce agency costs inherent in the
trust relationship-settlors can designate a trust protector to provide an
additional layer of supervision over the trustee. 96  The trust protector
device has become popular in modem trust practice because it enables
the settlor to select someone other than the beneficiary to monitor and
evaluate the trustee's conduct once the trust becomes irrevocable.97 The
device also allows the settlor "to repose primary decisionmaking
responsibility in a single authority-the trustee-subject only to
intermittent review by the protector. 98 Like most features of trust law,
the settlor enjoys wide latitude in defining the trust protector's powers
and remedies. For example, a trust protector may be empowered to
monitor and direct the trustee's conduct; where the trustee refuses to
comply with such direction, the trust protector may be empowered to
remove the trustee.99  By selecting a trustworthy and reliable trust
protector, the settlor can increase the probability that the trustee will be
compelled to carry out the settlor's donative intent. 00
95. See Sterk, supra note 88, at 2764. Professor Sterk explains, "First, the
beneficiaries themselves often lack the expertise to detect breach. Second, the
beneficiaries may be dependent on the trustee, and hence they may be reluctant to take
action to discipline the trustee. In combination, these factors suggest potential
underdeterrence of trustee misbehavior." Id. (footnotes omitted).
96. See Sitkoff, supra note 92, at 670-71 (predicting that trust protectors will tend to
reduce agency costs); Sterk, supra note 88, at 2805 (arguing that trust protectors may
reduce agency costs, but only when governed by "a fiduciary duty regime").
97. Cf Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in
American Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1877, 1916 (2000) ("An
important recent development in trust and estate planning practice, especially in
connection with offshore trusts, has been the use of trust 'protectors.' The protector may
be one of several trustees or a beneficiary, but often is neither, and may be granted
extensive authority or just a narrowly defined power to change trustees or the situs of
administration. Some protectors with broader authority are granted powers to clarify or
modify trust terms for purposes such as: qualifying for or accomplishing some specific
tax or nontax objective(s); improving administration or otherwise promoting the settlor's
general purposes or the beneficiaries' best interests; or adding or eliminating
beneficiaries or rearranging their rights.").
98. Sterk, supra note 88, at 2776.
99. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 (amended 2005). For statutes authorizing
trust protector powers to remove a trustee, see ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(b)(1) (2008);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6(4) (Supp. 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-710(a)(vii)
(2009).
100. See, e.g., Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Trust Protector: A Question of
Fiduciary Power, 59 DRAKE L. REv. 67, 68 (2010) ("For practical purposes, a trust
protector is generally a person selected by the settlor of a trust to represent the interests of
the settlor in making decisions related to the trust that the settlor is unable to make, most
often because the settlor is deceased. The idea behind the trust protector is to have a
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The nascent legal framework governing the trust protector device
has yet to resolve the matter of whether a trust protector should be
treated as a fiduciary, subject to personal liability for failure to discharge
protective responsibilities with care and loyalty.101 Like a trustee, a trust
protector is an agent of the settlor and beneficiaries, so the trust protector
device replicates many of the agency costs inherent in the settlor-trustee-
beneficiary relationship.0 2 Imposition of fiduciary duties on the trust
protector can help constrain those costs. 10 3 On the other hand, however,
by holding trust protectors to a fiduciary standard, subject to personal
liability, the law may deter otherwise willing individuals from serving as
a trust protector. In 2000, drafters of the Uniform Trust Code took the
position that trust protectors should be presumptively governed by
fiduciary duties unless the trust states otherwise. 10 4  Although the
Uniform Trust Code has been influential, not all states have adopted the
provision imposing fiduciary duties on trust protectors. In Arizona, for
example, trust protectors are presumptively not treated as fiduciaries.
10 5
Agency cost theory would seem to apply neatly in the Social
Security representative payee context because of its structural similarity
to the settlor-trustee-beneficiary relationship in the trust context.
Whereas some formulations of agency cost theory view the trustee as the
agent of two principals (the settlor and beneficiary), the same can be said
for the representative payee-the payee acts as an agent serving two
principals: SSA (analogous to the settlor) and the Social Security
beneficiary (analogous to the trust beneficiary). Like a trustee, the
representative payee is held to a fiduciary standard, but neither SSA nor
the beneficiary is a suitable monitor of the payee's performance. SSA,
which unlike private trustees has legal standing to enforce the payee's
duties, lacks access to information that would allow for proper evaluation
of the payee. The beneficiary, who by virtue of the representative payee
appointment has been found to suffer from a mental disability or
'living embodiment' of the settlor to represent the settlor's interests, even after the settlor
is gone. The trust protector is, at its core, an agent. No title is vested in the trust
protector as title is with the trustee-the protector has instead been chosen by the settlor
to have some level of power to guide the trustee's actions.") (footnotes omitted).
101. See, e.g., id at 68 ("No consensus has been drawn regarding the role of the trust
protector as it relates to the duties of a fiduciary.").
102. See Sterk, supra note 88, at 2773 (2005).
103. See id. at 2774.
104. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(d) (amended 2005).
105. See ARiz. REV. STAT. § 14-10818(D) (2009) ("[E]xcept to the extent otherwise
provided by the trust instrument, a trust protector is not a trustee or fiduciary and is not
liable or accountable as a trustee or fiduciary because of an act or omission of the trust
protector when performing or failing to perform the duties of a trust protector under the
trust instrument.").
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cognitive impairment, is unlikely to be capable of managing her own
financial affairs, let alone monitoring a third-party payee's more remote
conduct. Thus, the Social Security representative payee system creates
agency costs that manifest most acutely in the cost of monitoring the
payee's performance (or, alternatively, costs arising from SSA's failure
to monitor the payee's performance).
Because the settlor-trustee-beneficiary relationship and the Social
Security representative payee system are structurally similar, the trust
protector device may provide a useful model for reducing agency costs in
the Social Security representative payee system. Under the proposal
described in Part IV.A, the family representative would be the Social
Security program's analogue to the trust protector, empowered to
monitor the representative payee and report evidence of suspected
misuse to SSA. By limiting the family representative's powers to those
of monitoring and reporting, the family representative program would:
(1) minimize disruption to the existing representative payee system by
leaving intact SSA's primary repose of decisionmaking authority to the
payee; (2) prevent family representatives themselves from engaging in
fund misuse or fraud by not granting them direct access to the
beneficiary's Social Security funds; and (3) obviate the need to impose
fiduciary duties on the family representative (notwithstanding the current
debate concerning fiduciary treatment of trust protectors) by allowing
SSA to retain ultimate authority to determine whether the payee has
engaged in fund misuse and, if so, what remedies should be pursued.
CONCLUSION
The Social Security representative payee system serves an
important function by protecting beneficiaries who have cognitive
impairments and therefore cannot manage their own financial affairs.
For beneficiaries living in a nursing or group home setting, however, the
appointment of the home or home administrator as representative payee
creates conflicts of interest that adversely affect the beneficiary. Benefit
misuse by representative payees in this setting tends to go undetected
because SSA cannot audit every payee and the cognitively compromised
beneficiary is often incapable of detecting the financial impropriety. To
improve oversight of nursing and group home representative payees,
Congress should create a "family representative" program wherein a
concerned relative or friend volunteers to serve as a private watchdog
without assuming the burdens and liabilities of a representative payee
appointment. The family representative would be a person familiar with
the beneficiary's needs and circumstances and would receive a copy of
all reports submitted by the representative payee to SSA. The family
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representative's access to information regarding the payee's performance
would facilitate greater detection and reporting of benefit misuse to SSA
than under the current system.
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APPENDIX
The following proposed statute, drafted by the author of this Article,
would implement the family representative program described in Part III.
___ Congress
Session
To amend the Social Security Act to provide additional safeguards for
Social Security and Supplemental Security Income beneficiaries by
creating a "family representative" program to provide additional
supervision for certain representative payees.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
A BILL
To amend the Social Security Act to provide additional safeguards for
Social Security Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and
Supplemental Security Income beneficiaries by creating a "family
representative" program to provide additional supervision for certain
representative payees.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Social Security Act provides for retirement, disability, and
supplemental income for 56 million recipients of Social
Security Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASD1) and 7.9 million recipients of Supplemental Security
Income (SSI).
(2) A sizable minority of those beneficiaries receive payments
through a representative payee because they are unable to
manage their own financial affairs. Such beneficiaries are
1286 [Vol. 117:4
SOCIAL SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE MISUSE
among the most vulnerable members of society because they
often suffer from cognitive impairment or disability.
(3) For beneficiaries who live in a residential care facility, such as
a nursing or group home, and who lack a family member or
friend willing to serve as representative payee, the residential
care facility (or its administrator) is often appointed as
representative payee.
(4) When a residential care facility or its administrator serves as
representative payee, a conflict of interest arises because the
facility has a financial incentive to compensate, or in many
cases, overcompensate, itself for services provided to the
beneficiary by using funds drawn directly from the
beneficiary's Social Security payment.
(5) This conflict of interest has led to numerous instances of
benefit misuse by representative payees, including theft of
benefit payments and overcompensation for services rendered.
(6) Representative payees are subject to reporting requirements
and oversight by the Social Security Administration, but
current protections are insufficient to detect and prevent
representative payee benefit misuse.
(7) Beneficiaries who suffer from cognitive impairment or
disability are typically unable to detect or report misconduct by
the representative payee, thereby creating a circumstance that
precludes the Commissioner of Social Security from acquiring
adequate information to enforce existing statutory prohibitions
on benefit misuse.
(8) In a significant number of cases, the beneficiary's family and
friends are unwilling to accept the burdens and liabilities of a
representative payee appointment, but otherwise care and tend
to the beneficiary's needs. Such relatives or friends of the
beneficiary may be willing to provide a less onerous form of
assistance than appointment as representative payee:
supervision of the representative payee's performance.
(9) A beneficiary's family member or other concerned individual,
if properly designated by the Commissioner of Social Security
as a "family representative," would have superior access to
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information regarding the beneficiary's care and, therefore,
would be more likely to detect and report benefit misuse by the
representative payee.
(10) Oversight of the representative payee by a family
representative may deter benefit misuse, place the beneficiary
at greater ease in knowing that a trusted individual is
monitoring the payee, and open new lines of communication
between the residential care facility and the beneficiary's
family to enable greater discussion and evaluation of the
beneficiary's needs.
(b) STATEMENT OF PURPOSE-It is the purpose of this Act to
prevent the misuse of funds by representative payees by establishing a
family representative program wherein a family member or other
individual concerned about the welfare of a Social Security beneficiary
may be granted sufficient authority and information to supervise the
performance of the beneficiary's representative payee, particularly in
cases where the beneficiary's residential care facility, such as a nursing
or group home, serves as the representative payee.
SECTION 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF FAMILY REPRESENTATIVE
PROGRAM.
(a) IN GENERAL-If the Commissioner of Social Security determines
that the interest of any individual receiving benefits under this title would
be served thereby, designation of a family relative or other individual
concerned for the individual's welfare (hereinafter in this subsection
referred to as the individual's "family representative") may be made to
provide additional supervision of the individual's representative payee,
subject to the selection requirements, powers, and limitations set forth in
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subsection.
(1) APPOINTMENT AND SELECTION OF A FAMILY
REPRESENTATIVE-Selection and appointment of a family
representative shall be based on the same criteria for selection
and appointment of the individual's representative payee under
42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(A).
(A) The Commissioner of Social Security shall, before
appointing a family representative, verify that the
prospective family representative is personally known to
and familiar with the individual.
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(B) Where a beneficiary's residential care facility, as defined
in 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)(iii)(III), or the residential care
facility's administrator, has been appointed representative
payee, the Commissioner of Social Security shall
undertake reasonable efforts to identify a concerned
individual willing to serve as family representative.
(2) POWERS OF THE FAMILY REPRESENTATIVE-The
family representative shall have the following powers:
(A) entitlement to receive and review all accountings
submitted by the representative payee under 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.2065; and
(B) standing to request an investigation by the Commissioner
of Social Security upon discovery of suspected benefit
misuse by the representative payee.
(3) LIMITATION OF FAMILY REPRESENTATIVE'S
LIABILITY-The family representative shall owe no
fiduciary obligation to the beneficiary and shall not be liable
for failure to detect or report misuse of funds by the
representative payee.
(4) REGULATIONS-The Commissioner shall promulgate
regulations to enact the family representative program and
establish criteria for the selection of family representatives
according to subparts (1)-(3).
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